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The “Death of the Author” in Hegel and Kierkegaard: 
A Review Essay on Daniel Berthold’s The Ethics of Authorship 
Antony Aumann 
1. Introduction 
Daniel Berthold’s The Ethics of Authorship: Communication, Seduction, and Death in He-
gel and Kierkegaard1
Berthold focuses his attention on the “ethics of authorship,” i.e. the rules go-
verning authors’ relationships with their readers (EA 3). His main thesis is that Hegel and 
Kierkegaard meet their obligations here by attempting to “die as authors” (EA 12; see 
also EA 9-11). As this locution suggests, Berthold portrays Hegel and Kierkegaard as an-
 is a well-written book, provocative in its theses, expansive in its 
scope, and creative in its execution. It prompts us to envision the relationship between 
Hegel and Kierkegaard in novel ways and within a previously neglected framework, 
namely their approaches to communication, writing, and language. Nudging us beyond 
surface dissimilarities, it explores Hegel and Kierkegaard’s shared authorial project of 
helping readers progress toward selfhood as well as their shared literary strategies for 
undertaking this project. All the while, it documents how subtle differences between the 
two thinkers’ conceptions of selfhood influence their attitudes regarding the relation-
ship with others inherent in communication. Most intriguing, however, is a possible per-
formative component to the book. It may well enact the very ethics of authorship it de-
scribes, thereby standing as a testament to the virtues of accommodating self-reference 
and avoiding self-forgetfulness. 
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ticipating the concerns of postmodern thinkers from Barthes and Derrida to Foucault 
and Lacan (EA 134). In fact, Barthes’s comment concerning Mallarmé in “The Death of 
the Author” more or less reflects Berthold’s reading of Hegel and Kierkegaard: “Mal-
larmé’s entire poetics consists in suppressing the author in the interests of writing 
(which is, as will be seen, to restore the place of the reader).”2
The phrase, “the death of the author,” picks out several different ideas for Ber-
thold. On the one hand, it refers to an ethical ideal Hegel and Kierkegaard purportedly 
embrace. To wit, authors should abdicate their traditional privileged position as arbiters 
of their texts’ meaning. Instead, they ought to allow readers to determine this meaning 
for themselves. In so doing, they will help readers attain genuine selfhood and avoid a 
kind of inhuman madness, the madness of refusing to become a self. 
 
On the other hand, “the death of the author” refers to two claims about lan-
guage that Hegel and Kierkegaard allegedly endorse. First, the meaning of a text is not 
dictated by the author’s intentions but by the interpretations of readers. Indeed, no lin-
guistic artifact possesses meaning apart from that given to it by readers. Second, lan-
guage cannot express an author’s thoughts, feelings, or experiences. It negates, annuls, 
or “kills” this “inner reality” (EA 57). Thus, what we might think of as ordinary communi-
cation, the conveyance of ideas from one person to another, is impossible (EA 144-5). 
The rest of this essay will investigate these aspects of the “death of the author” 
in more detail. Sections 2 and 3 will fill out Berthold’s account of Hegel’s and Kierke-
gaard’s views on the topic. Sections 4 through 6 will discuss some potential challenges 
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for Berthold’s interpretation. In keeping with the theme of this volume of the journal, 
the concerns raised will focus primarily on his treatment of Kierkegaard. 
2. The “Death of the Author” as an Ethical Ideal 
The point of departure for Berthold’s book is that Hegel and Kierkegaard believe authors 
have responsibilities to their readers. There exists, for them, an “ethics of authorship.” 
The primary guidelines follow the dictates of common sense: Do not manipulate read-
ers. Do not subjugate them to your own desires. Allow them to function as independent, 
self-determining agents. 
Berthold also maintains that Hegel and Kierkegaard endorse the following corol-
lary: Do not adopt a position of authority over your readers. This additional rule lacks 
the intuitive pull of the others, at least if construed as universal in scope. Consider a 
note from a parent, left for a son, telling him to make his bed. Or take an edict from a 
judge ordering a citizen to “cease and desist” in some illegal activity. In such and similar 
cases, the writer legitimately possesses authority over his or her intended audience. Ex-
ercising it via a printed medium is no transgression of justice or violation of ethical pro-
priety. 
Of course, taking up an authoritative stance can be morally dubious. It is so most 
obviously when it involves usurping power over others to which one is not entitled. 
Kierkegaard discusses this possibility in The Book on Adler and “The Difference between 
a Genius and an Apostle.”3 Apostles, he says, are permitted to tell others what to be-
lieve or which activities to undertake in the religious sphere. The reason is simple: God 
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has granted them the right to do so. Those who have not received a divine mandate 
may not issue such instructions. They must allow others to make up their own minds 
concerning religious matters. 
However, this type of situation does not capture what Berthold has in mind. He 
attributes to Hegel and Kierkegaard a more radical idea. To wit, authors should never 
serve as authorities regarding the meaning of their own words. They should never dic-
tate to readers how to interpret their texts. Instead, they ought to write in a fashion that 
allows readers to decide upon an interpretation for themselves. 
The rationale behind this idea is intriguing. Berthold claims that when authors fix 
the meaning of their sentences, they place the reader at their mercy. They subjugate 
the reader to their wills. How so? Well, if readers wish to know what a text means, they 
must submit to the authority of the author (EA 138). They must sacrifice their autonomy 
to the God of the author’s voice, to use Barthes’s words.4
According to Berthold, Kierkegaard’s indirect manner of communication (EA 26-
8, 30, 59-60, 140), and his use of pseudonyms in particular (EA 28, 65, 132), illustrate 
how to uphold this ethical requirement. In his pseudonymous writings, Kierkegaard 
speaks to us from behind the masks of unknown figures with enigmatic personalities. 
These characters may be intent upon irony or edification, tell jokes or offer sage advice. 
 To avoid this undesirable state 
of affairs, the author must allow readers to construct the meaning of the text for them-
selves (EA 61). Preserving readers’ independence here requires the author to hide his or 
her intentions from view (EA 61, 135, 137). In sum, authors have a duty to enact their 
disappearance or “deaths” (EA 61, 80-1, 135, 142). 
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We cannot tell which. Thus we are cut free from the stable moorings of authorial guid-
ance. We must rely on our own devices when deciding upon the meaning of the texts 
we encounter. Yet, Berthold points out, precisely because we must fend for ourselves 
now, we have become autonomous. We have been liberated from the tyranny of the 
author (EA 30-1, 59-61). In sum, “the disappearance of the author [behind the masks of 
pseudonymity] is the ethical act of indirect communication by which the reader comes 
face to face with her own freedom and responsibility for constructing a meaning of her 
own” (EA 61). 
Strikingly, Berthold claims that Hegel too practices indirect communication (EA 
4-5, 31, 33-5, 38, 162). Of course, it is tempting to take the opposite view, to see Hegel 
as the self-proclaimed “Wise Man” who directly imparts “Absolute Knowledge” to his 
readers (EA 96, 160). Several twentieth-century French critics accuse Hegel of subjecting 
readers to his authority in this very fashion (EA 12, 160-1, 176). But Berthold rejects 
their interpretation. He maintains that Hegel eschews ordinary assertions (EA 11, 33-4, 
90-3, 166) and refuses to provide assurances as to the truth of what he says (EA 166). 
Moreover, the so-called “Absolute Knowledge” he provides “has no content of its own” 
(EA 176). It does not encompass his final answers, insights, or wisdom (EA 177). The ap-
pearance of such is a mirage. Hegel writes so that the “meanings [of his statements] are 
never ‘at rest’ but perpetually ‘dissolve and pass over’ into new configurations” (EA 166; 
see also EA 124). In the end, his words say nothing but what we make of them (EA 93). 
Thus we must tell our own story about the content of “Absolute Knowledge” (EA 11, 32, 
93, 176, 178). 
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3. The “Death of the Author” as a Set of Claims about Language 
I said earlier that Berthold also employs the phrase, “the death of the author,” to pick 
out two positions Hegel and Kierkegaard allegedly hold regarding the nature of lan-
guage. The philosophical motivations for these views remain obscure throughout Ber-
thold’s book. Nevertheless, we can articulate the views themselves in a fairly 
straightforward fashion. 
First, the author is dead for Hegel and Kierkegaard in the sense that authorial in-
tentions do not fix the meaning of a text. Although it has its detractors,5 this point is not 
inordinately controversial. Even Searle, set up as the antipode to Hegel and Kierkegaard 
(EA 129), accepts that the meaning of a sentence does not depend on the intentions of 
the speaker who uttered it.6
Several consequences of this position become refrains in The Ethics of Author-
ship. Berthold states in a number of places that Hegel and Kierkegaard deny that au-
thors have privileged access to the meaning of their texts (EA 18-9, 139, 166). On the 
contrary, authors understand their texts no better than readers. Berthold also repeated-
ly asserts that, for Hegel and Kierkegaard, “language is more honest than intention” (EA 
16-24, 33). This cryptic phrase refers to the Derridean notion that sentences always 
 However, Berthold attributes two additional claims to He-
gel and Kierkegaard. They supposedly believe that sentential meaning is not dictated by 
conventional semantic and syntactic rules. Rather, it is determined by the individual 
reader’s interpretation, which need not follow any such rules. As Berthold puts it, “the 
site of meaning is shifted onto the reader’s response” (EA 62; see also EA 19, 170). 
These views do put Hegel and Kierkegaard at odds with Searle. 
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mean something more and something other than what their authors intended (EA 33).7
Second, Berthold maintains that the author is dead for Hegel and Kierkegaard in 
the sense that readers can never discover an author’s intentions (EA 17-9, 24). The pri-
mary reason they cannot do so is that language cannot capture the contents of an au-
thor’s mind (EA 17, 57, 145, 170). This inner world—or inner reality, as Berthold some-
times calls it—is ineffable (EA 26-7). In fact, language destroys it: “Like Kierkegaard, He-
gel understands language as involving a certain ‘annulment of reality,’ or a ‘destruction 
of reality,’ as Sartre put it to Beauvoir. In particular, language entails the negation of the 
private reality of the speaker” (EA 57). Consequently, an unbridgeable chasm exists be-
tween author and reader (EA 12, 27, 37, 53, 67, 139, 143, 176). Communication as we 
ordinarily understand it is impossible (EA 144).
 
The underlying idea here is that the process of interpretation continues ad infinitum. 
Since readers’ interpretations determine the meaning of a sentence, each new interpre-
tation imbues the sentence with new meaning. These new meanings quickly outstrip 
whatever the author or speaker had in mind. 
8
4. Exegetical Challenges 
 
Berthold’s ability to trace the manifold meanings and implications of “the death of the 
author” in Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s thought is impressive. In this respect alone, his 
work constitutes an important addition to the growing tradition of reading both figures 
as anticipating postmodern concerns.9 Nevertheless, I wish to raise a series of chal-
lenges to his account. I will begin with ones that are exegetical in nature. 
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First, Berthold frequently cites a pair of passages that have become pillars of 
support for postmodern readings of Kierkegaard. Both passages come from Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript. Both imply that authors are not the best interpreters of their 
own texts: 
I am pleased that the pseudonymous authors…have themselves not said any-
thing or misused a preface to take an official position on the production, as if in a 
purely legal sense an author were the best interpreter of his own words.10
Thus in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me. I have no 
opinion about them except as a third party, no knowledge of their meaning ex-
cept as a reader.
 
11
These selections provide strong evidence in favor of Berthold’s position. However, they 
are counterbalanced by others. For example, in a discussion of John 12:32 located in 
Practice in Christianity, we read:  
 
How the sacred words just read are to be understood we have shown from vari-
ous sides, not as if their meaning has thereby become different, no, but we have 
tried to come from various sides to one and the same meaning of the words. Nor 
will anyone be likely to deny to us that this is the right meaning of the words. But 
to confirm this we shall not fail to cite the person who not only as the author of 
these words is the best interpreter of his own words but by his divine authority 
calls for silence and cuts off all further interpretation if it does not lead to the 
same interpretation: the Apostle John.12 
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We might hesitate to place great weight on these lines because they concern scripture, 
always a special case for Kierkegaard. Yet, there exists another passage that does not 
suffer from this difficulty. In the “Preface” to Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 
Kierkegaard provides instructions concerning how readers should approach the book. 
Specifically, he describes three attitudes (“admiration,” “criticism,” and “recognition”) 
that will result in misunderstanding if adopted.13
Any advocate of Berthold’s view must wrestle with Kierkegaard’s inconsistency 
on this point. Given that Practice in Christianity (1851) occurs later than Concluding Un-
scientific Postscript (1846), a developmental view is tempting. Kierkegaard may (wrong-
ly) have come to abandon his early position that authors are not the best interpreters of 
their works. Unfortunately, this hypothesis is not viable. Three Discourses on Imagined 
Occasions (1845) was published a year before Postscript. In addition, Kierkegaard reite-
rates the claim that he has no privileged position regarding the meaning of his pseudo-
nymous writings as late as On My Work as on Author (1851).
 These comments suggest that Kierke-
gaard does see himself as an authority when it comes to the interpretation of his writ-
ings.  
14
Second, Berthold’s claim that, for Kierkegaard, mental content is ineffable heavi-
ly relies on a brief passage from the unpublished Johannes Climacus, or, De Omnibus 
 A more plausible inter-
pretation is that Kierkegaard draws a distinction between different types of texts. For 
some (perhaps signed works and scripture), authors are the best interpreters of their 
own words; for others (perhaps pseudonymous writings), they are not. Of course, ac-
cepting this alternative hypothesis would require Berthold to alter his view. 
10 
 
Dubitandum Est.15
This could be expressed, [Johannes Climacus] thought, by saying that the imme-
diate [Umiddelbart] is reality, language is ideality, since by speaking I produce 
the contradiction. When I seek to express sense perception [Sandsningen] in this 
way, the contradiction is present, for what I say is something different from what 
I want to say.
 The passage states that language cannot express “immediacy [Umid-
delbarhed].” The problem is that Kierkegaard does not use “immediacy [Umiddel-
barhed]” to refer to the entirety of the mental realm. This is particularly true in the case 
of Johannes Climacus, where it refers merely to the contents of perceptual experience. 
For example, in one draft of the book—and all we have are drafts—we read:  
16
In another draft, Kierkegaard writes, “Immediacy [Umiddelbarheden] does not 
allow itself to be expressed at all.”
 
17 He then proceeds to talk about the impossibility of 
expressing the content of sense perception: “Thus as soon as I want to express imme-
diacy in language, contradiction is present, for language is ideal. As long as I am defined 
as merely a sensory being, everything is true; as soon as I want to express sensation 
[Sandsningen], contradiction is present.”18
Berthold seems aware of the issue I raise. In fact, his discussion of expressing 
immediacy focuses on the difficulties with conveying the content of sensory experience 
(EA 17-8). However, if immediacy refers only to the content of sensory experience, the 
ineffability of immediacy does not entail the incommunicability of all mental content. 
Kierkegaard may hold the latter position, but one cannot rightly base the claim that he 
does on the aforementioned passages from Johannes Climacus.
  
19 
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Third, Berthold’s interpretation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of language oblite-
rates the distinction drawn in Concluding Unscientific Postscript between accidental and 
essential secrets.20 Accidental secrets refer to that which a person could share but de-
cides to keep private. Essential secrets refer to that which a person cannot make public 
even in principle. As we have seen, on Berthold’s account, Kierkegaard believes that a 
person can never share his or her thoughts with others. Common sense communication, 
the meeting of minds, is impossible. Consequently, there can be no accidental secrets, 
only essential ones. This implication does not reflect what we read in the text. For the 
text explicitly states that there can be accidental secrets; some mental content can be 
communicated, at least in principle.21
Fourth, Berthold’s position undermines another important distinction Kierke-
gaard draws, namely the one between direct and indirect communication. These terms 
are notoriously obscure. But, for the purposes of argument, we can follow Berthold’s 
interpretation. He maintains that indirect communication refers to writing in which the 
author disappears so that readers are left to reconstruct the meaning of the text for 
themselves (EA 59-61). By contrast, direct communication refers to writing in which the 
author sets forth the meaning of his or her text in an authoritative fashion (EA 4, 83). 
The problem is that, on Berthold’s account of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of language, au-
thors cannot fix the meaning of their texts. Readers always have to determine for them-
selves the meaning of the words they encounter. In fact, words have no meaning be-
sides that which readers give them. Therefore, all interactions between authors and 
readers fall under the description Berthold supplies for indirect communication. In other 
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words, whether he admits it or not, all communication is indirect on his view.22 This im-
plication contradicts the suggestion in Postscript that ordinary communication is di-
rect.23 It also conflicts with Kierkegaard’s claim that he sometimes employs direct com-
munication.24
5. First Conceptual Challenge 
 Finally, it cuts against the grain of Berthold’s own suggestion that Kierke-
gaard sought to develop an indirect style of writing that opposed the direct style used 
by his contemporaries (EA 4). 
I will raise two broadly conceptual challenges to Berthold’s interpretation of Hegel and 
Kierkegaard. The first concerns the relationship between their philosophy of language 
and their ethics of authorship. Berthold’s official position is that the former drives the 
latter. Hegel and Kierkegaard’s views about language dictate which writing styles they 
believe they should use. In particular, they think they should employ styles that enable 
them to relate to readers in a nonauthoritarian fashion. For example, we read in the in-
troduction to The Ethics of Authorship:  
Both [Hegel and Kierkegaard] held views of language that led them to develop 
styles of writing that sought a nonauthoritarian relation to the reader (Kierke-
gaard’s depiction of Hegel as quintessentially autocratic author notwithstand-
ing), and the ethics of communication in each case circles around the problem of 
how to achieve this: how to author a text that does not reduce the reader to a 
mere pretext, or a representation, or sign of the author’s signification. (EA 10, 
emphasis added) 
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However, this position seems untenable. On Berthold’s account, Hegel and Kierke-
gaard’s philosophy of language says that authors cannot determine the meaning of their 
texts. Meaning is always determined by readers. Thus, no matter how they write, it is 
impossible for authors to adopt an authoritative stance over their readers with regard to 
the meaning of their texts. Since adhering to the ethics of authorship is about avoiding 
this particular kind of authoritative stance (EA 10), it follows that all writing styles fall 
within ethical bounds. Therefore, far from motivating the ethical project of finding non-
authoritarian writing styles, Hegel and Kierkegaard’s philosophy of language renders it 
superfluous. 
A serious problem for Berthold’s book arises at this point. Its stated goal is to in-
vestigate which writing styles allow a person to live up to the ethics of authorship: 
This is a book about the ethics of authorship. It explores different conceptualiza-
tions of the author’s responsibilities to the reader. But it also engages the ques-
tion of which styles of authorship allow for these responsibilities to be met. (EA 
7) 
Berthold paints both Hegel and Kierkegaard as intensely preoccupied with this project. 
Indeed, one of his main theses is that, contrary to appearance, Hegel is just as con-
cerned about it as Kierkegaard: 
Part of the aim of this book is to complicate this picture of Hegel so as to allow 
him to emerge, as from behind an eclipse, as an author deeply concerned with 
the ethics of authorship…. (EA 4) 
14 
 
By realigning the kaleidoscopic images of Hegel and Kierkegaard, Hegel emerges 
as a much more subtle practitioner of style than in Kierkegaard’s representation 
of him—indeed as a practitioner whose style is in the service of an ambitious re-
conceptualization of the ethics of authorship…. (EA 6) 
Although it is true in one sense that the Hegelian philosophy lacks an ethics, I ar-
gue that in a deeper sense Hegel is as concerned with the ethics of authorship as 
is Kierkegaard. (EA 9) 
To support his position, Berthold develops a radical story about Hegel’s grammar of as-
sertion that attempts to recast how we think about the statements set forth in Hegel’s 
works. Yet, given what I have said, it is unclear why Berthold needs to tell such a story. If 
Hegel’s philosophy of language entails that all writing styles conform to the require-
ments of his ethics of authorship, then he does not have to construct a novel method of 
philosophical writing in order to live up to these requirements. Consequently, a signifi-
cant part of Berthold’s book appears unmotivated. 
6. Second Conceptual Challenge 
There is another, related problem that afflicts Berthold’s discussion of Hegel and Kierke-
gaard’s ethics of authorship. On the one hand, Berthold purports to have uncovered 
their actual ethics of authorship, the views on the topic they in fact hold.25 Moreover, 
he writes as if having done so on the basis of a close reading of their works. On the oth-
er hand, Berthold describes their ethics of authorship as involving a refusal to assign 
meanings to their sentences (EA 134-5). He declares that, for Kierkegaard, “each pseu-
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donymous work ends in meaninglessness” (EA 80); as a group, they “elude and evade 
literal meaning” (EA 80). Similarly, he says that “the entirety of Hegel’s philosophy is a 
work of irony” (EA 92; see also EA 33) in which we encounter what Lacan calls “a perpe-
tual deferral of meaning” (EA 92-3; see also 33-4).26
First, if Hegel and Kierkegaard had done what Berthold says, then all connection 
between their thoughts and their words would be severed. Consequently, reading their 
texts could not lead to a discovery of their views. Any commentary on their work would 
be the commentator’s own creation. It would be his or her subjective interpretation of a 
series of Rorschach ink blot tests, to use Berthold’s metaphor (EA 5). Others might see 
what the commentator did. However, Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s writings would not ex-
press what they saw any more than Rorschach ink blots represent the images people 
perceive in them. Thus, no commentary would teach us about Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s 
views. The Ethics of Authorship would be no exception. As such, it would fail to do what 
it purports to do. It would not disclose Hegel and Kierkegaard’s actual ethics of author-
ship. 
 These two points stand in tension, 
each seeming to require the sacrifice of the other. Let me explain. 
Second, if Berthold’s book did reveal Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s views, then Hegel 
and Kierkegaard would have failed to achieve their goals. For, according to Berthold, 
Hegel and Kierkegaard sought to conceal what they believed. They endeavored to pre-
vent readers from discovering what they thought. Yet, The Ethics of Authorship would 
stand as a testament to fact that astute readers could uncover their secrets after all. 
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In sum, we must choose. We can be charitable toward Hegel and Kierkegaard or 
toward Berthold. We can maintain that Hegel and Kierkegaard succeeded in their au-
thorial projects or that Berthold did. 
It is conceivable that the existence of this dilemma is intentional. Berthold may 
have constructed his book so as to allow readers to decide how to construe it. He may 
have engaged in the very practice of indirect communication he describes. This interpre-
tation is suggested by the fact that Berthold appears partial to the ethics of authorship 
he attributes to Hegel and Kierkegaard. For instance, in the acknowledgments at the 
outset of the book, he discusses his relationship with his students at the Eastern Correc-
tional Facility. He says that these inmates have “no need for an author who will only fur-
ther discipline [them] into submission or even who will give only the gift of knowledge” 
(EA xi-ii). They require “the gift of liberation,” the opportunity to discover their own 
voices. And they receive this gift upon encountering texts in which the meaning is de-
termined by their own responses (EA xii). It would not surprise if Berthold sought to 
write such a text. However, I leave it to other readers of The Ethics of Authorship to de-
termine whether he has done so.  
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